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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research Question 
With the ongoing liberalisation of international trade, the rise of ‘economic liberalism’ 
as a political philosophy and the turn of many former socialist systems to free market 
economy, transnational corporations (TNCs) have become extremely powerful actors in 
the current world order. This enormous economic (and also de facto political) power 
puts TNCs in the position to influence the enjoyment of internationally acknowledged 
human rights, for example the rights of their employees or of the people living in the 
area of their operation. The 1984 ‘Bhopal disaster’ (in which a lack of safety 
arrangements brought a TNC-pesticide-plant to accidentally release toxic gas causing 
the immediate death of over 2000 people)1 is possibly the most prominent example of 
possible human rights abuses by TNCs.2 
So far no generally applicable definition for the ‘phenomenon’ TNC exists. However, a 
TNC can either consist of only one corporate entity operating in more than one country, 
or it is a cluster of corporate entities operating in two or more countries. The states 
where TNCs (or in cases of a ‘cluster of entities’: the ‘parent companies’) are 
incorporated are often developed states. These states are referred to as ‘home states’ of 
the TNCs.  As implied in their name TNCs operate transnational and, thus, conduct 
business also in other states than their home state. These ‘other states’ are referred to as 
‘host states’. At an increasing rate developing states have become ‘host states’, be it 
because they are attractive regional markets for goods or services, or because they 
provide profitable conditions for the production of goods (such as low production costs, 
low wages, low mandatory safety standards, low taxes and a low level of regulation by 
the state). 
                                                 
1
 Joseph (2004), p. 2 
2
 For a list of human rights which can be impaired by TNCs see: Paust (2002), p. 817f 
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In the last decades questions such as on ‘corporate human rights standards’ and  
accountability of TNCs for abuses of internationally acknowledged human rights have 
gained in importance. In this context the enforcement of internationally acknowledged 
‘corporate human rights standards’ in host states has always been a central question. 
‘Corporate human rights standards’ (i.e. standards that have to be observed by private 
corporations with respect to human rights) mainly derive from human rights treaties, to 
which also the majority of host states are party. The enforcement of these standards is, 
according to the allocation of international human rights law, first and foremost the duty 
of the host states. They are obliged to enforce the standards on their territory by 
controlling all business activities conducted within their territorial borders (‘positive 
obligations’). However, for different reasons many host states do not control the 
business activities on their territory sufficiently. This can be motivated by a lack of 
capacity, a lack of interest, or even by a lack of willingness of the host states (for 
example when a host state’s interest in foreign investment prevails over its interest in 
the protection of human rights).   
In consequence of these shortcomings in the enforcement of ‘corporate human rights 
standards’ by the host states, alternative ways of enforcement have attracted attention.  
In this context it has often been discussed whether home states of TNCs could 
contribute to the enforcement of ‘corporate human rights standards’ in host states by 
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the TNCs.  This implies first and foremost 
that home states transfer internationally acknowledged ‘corporate human rights 
standards’ into domestic law which they then apply to the TNCs with respect to their 
business activities abroad.  
Therefore, the research question of this thesis is: If and to what extent international does 
international law allow home states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over the 
TNCs in order to enforce internationally acknowledged ‘corporate human rights 
standards’ in host states.  However, since extraterritorial jurisdiction covers a wider 
range of approaches and scenarios as this thesis is - due to its limited capacity - able to 
address, the thesis will be limited to extraterritorial jurisdiction which is based on the 
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internationally acknowledged ‘active nationality principle’. According to this principle 
a state may regulate the activities, interests, status or relations of its nationals, not only 
inside but also outside its territory. Other internationally acknowledged bases for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (such as for example the concept of ’universal jurisdiction’) 
will not be discussed. Additionally, further limitations of the reasearch question are 
necessary und will be highlighted in the following sections of this introduction. 
1.2 Definitions and Explanatory Notes 
‘TNCs’ 
For the purpose of this thesis TNCs are conceived widely, as ‘economic entities 
operating in more than one country, or as a cluster of economic entities operating in two 
or more countries’. 
Corporate Structures of TNCs 
When TNCs consist of more than one corporate entity, they often have complex 
corporate structures including parent companies, subsidiaries, subcontractors, 
franchisees and licensees. Subcontractors, franchisees and licensees are autonomous 
corporations conducting business for TNCs solely on contractual basis. Though 
likewise an autonomous corporation, subsidiaries are additionally also a member of the 
TNC as ‘multi-corporate enterprise’. The TNC parent companies hold shares in them, 
and, thus, own and control them. Usually an autonomous corporation is considered to 
be a ‘subsidiary’ of another company (the ‘parent’) if that other company holds more 
than 50 % of the shares.3 ‘Full control’ over the subsidiary is usually achieved by 
holding 100% of the shares, or by holding so many shares that no other shareholder can 
block or veto decisions and orders of the parent. This thesis will only consider scenarios 
in which a TNC conducts its business activities in a host state by a subsidiary, and in 
which the subsidiary is fully owned or fully controlled by a TNC parent company. 
                                                 
3
 Alternative thresholds might be: ‘more than 66,66%’ or ‘more than 75%’  
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Whereas TNC parent companies are usually incorporated and located in their home 
state, their subsidiaries can be incorporated either in the home state (where the parent is 
incorporated), or in the host state (where the business in conducted), or in a third state 
(where the law governing the incorporation might be more favourable). In practice 
TNC-subsidiaries are often incorporated in the host state in which they conduct 
business. The main reason for this is that many host states require the incorporation of a 
subsidiary under their law if a TNC wants to conduct business on their territory.4 
Another reason for an incorporation in the host state is that TNCs sometimes acquire 
corporations which already were incorporated in the host state.5 However, the thesis 
will be limited to scenarios in which the subsidiary conducting business for a TNC in a 
host state is incorporated under the laws of that host state. 
‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’  
The term ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ is generally used to denote a wide variety of 
different issues. This thesis conceives ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ as summation of 
three different aspects of state power: 6 
- Extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction  
(= the power of a state to apply its laws to cases involving a foreign 
element)  
- Extraterritorial executive jurisdiction  
(= the power of a state to perform acts in the territory of another state) 
- Extraterritorial judicial jurisdiction  
(= the power of a states courts to try cases involving a foreign element) 
This thesis will be limited to ‘legislative extraterritorial jurisdiction’. Aspects of 
extraterritorial enforcement and judicial jurisdiction will not be discussed. The term 
‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ will therefore be used as equivalent to ‘extraterritorial 
legislative jurisdiction’.  
                                                 
4
 Schreuer (2005), p. 4 
5
 Schreuer (2005), p. 4 
6
 Based on: Akehurst (1974), p. 25 
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‘Thesis scenario’ 
The analysis provided in this thesis will be limited to a certain scenario, which will be 
always be referred to as ‘thesis scenario’. It is defined as follows: 
- A TNC conducts business in a host state by a subsidiary. 
- The parent company fully owns or fully controls the subsidiary. 
- The parent company is incorporated in the home state. 
- The subsidiary is incorporated it the host state in which it is 
conducting business. It is therefore often referred to as ‘foreign 
subsidiary’. 
- The ‘corporate human rights standards’ the home state enforces 
by extraterritorial jurisdiction are limited to such standards which 
the host state is (by international law) obliged to enforce on its 
territory.  
1.3 Methodology and Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis will be divided in two parts. In the first part the thesis will analyse which 
‘corporate human rights standards’ derive from international law. This analysis will be 
limited to standards deriving from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), customary law and jus cogens (for the purpose of this thesis conceived as 
being part of customary law). The analysis will be based on an interpretation of the two 
covenants, on the ‘general comments’ of the competent treaty committees, on literature, 
and (for the area of customary law) on state practice.  
In the second part the thesis will analyse if and to what extent international law allows 
home states of TNCs to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over TNCs aiming at 
enforcement of internationally acknowledged ‘corporate human rights standards’ in a 
host state. The analysis will be strictly limited to the ‘thesis scenario’. As the thesis 
considers only extraterritorial jurisdiction which is based on the ‘active nationality 
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principle’, the second part of the thesis will start with an analysis of this principle. In 
this context the thesis will discuss under which circumstances a home state can assert 
‘corporate nationality’ of a TNC entity. Subsequently, the thesis will identify which 
limitations international law provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Particular focus 
will be the limitations deriving from the sovereignty of the host states. In a second step 
the identified limitations will be applied to the ‘thesis scenario’. For this purpose the 
‘thesis scenario’ will be split up in several sub-scenarios. The analysis of the limitations 
international law provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction in the ‘thesis scenario’ will be 
approached by two different perspectives: The perspective of the classical doctrine on 
international jurisdiction and a human rights perspective. 
1.4 Scope of the Thesis and Limitations 
The strictly limited scope of this thesis can be summarised as follows: TNCs conduct 
business in host states by subsidiaries, which are also incorporated in the host states and 
are fully owned or fully controlled by a TNC parent company, which itself is 
incorporated in the home state. The thesis considers only legislative extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, and only jurisdiction which is based on the active nationality principle and 
which aims at the enforcement of ‘corporate human rights standards’ deriving from the 
ICCPR, ICESCR, customary law and jus cogens. Further human rights standards, 
standards of international labour law and environmental aspects will not be considered. 
Furthermore home states solely enforce such ‘corporate human rights standards’ which 
the host state is obliged to enforce on its territory anyway. In addition, the thesis 
analysis only discusses the right of home states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and will not discuss if homes states might even be obliged to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in some cases. Finally it should be mentioned that the thesis is limited to 
legal aspects, i.e. to the question if home states could exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Political aspects, i.e. the question if they also should exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, will not be considered. 
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2 TNCs and Human Rights - ‘Corporate Human Rights Standards’ 
Topic of the thesis is the enforcement of ‘corporate human rights standards’ (i.e. 
‘human rights related obligations’ of TNCs) by extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by 
home states of TNC. International law contains such ‘corporate human rights standards’ 
in two forms:  
- Direct obligations of TNCs (to observe certain human rights)  
- Indirect obligations of TNCs (to observe certain human rights), by 
imposing the positive obligation on states to control TNCs and prevent 
them from affecting the enjoyment of certain human rights. 
The following sections will discuss the ‘corporate human rights standards’ deriving 
from the ICCPR, from the ICESCR and from  universal customary human rights law. In 
addition, a short analysis will  be given on host states’ capacity, willingness and interest 
with respect to the enforcement of such ‘corporate human rights standards’ on their 
territory. 
2.1 Corporate Standards in ICCPR and ICESCR 
For this thesis it is important to analyse which ‘corporate human rights standards’ 
derive from ICCPR and ICESCR, since these are the ‘corporate human rights standards’ 
which - in the ‘thesis scenario’ - are subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised 
by TNCs’ home states. 
2.1.1 ICCPR and ICESCR and Direct Obligations of TNC 
This section will discuss whether ICCPR and ICESCR contain ‘corporate human rights 
standards’ by imposing direct obligations on TNCs: 
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Recently, there has been the tendency amongst scholars to advocate the two covenants 
would contain direct obligations for TNCs.7 However, the more persuasive arguments 
support the assumption that the two covenants do not oblige TNCs directly:8  
- Art. 2 (1) ICCPR/ICESCR, which formulate the obligations of the state 
parties in general terms, address exclusively ‘State Parties’ as duty holder. 
Likewise do the particular human rights in the ICESCR, which each 
explicitly address the ‘State Parties’.   
- The 5th preambular paragraph of the ICCPR/ICESCR has sometimes been 
considered an explicit recognition of the existence of direct human rights 
obligations of non-state actors.9 However, it does not contain any textual 
indication for the assumption that TNCs would be duty bearers under the 
covenants, since it only refers to ‘individuals’. In addition, this preambular 
paragraph only states that individuals are under “the responsibility to strive 
for the promotion and observance of the rights […]” (emphasis added), 
and, thus, does not contain textual indication that individuals (or even 
other non-state actors) were supposed to be legally bound by the 
covenants. 
- Art. 5 (1) ICCPR/ICESCR is as well sometimes understood as impliedly 
affirming the existence of direct human rights obligations of non-state 
actors.10 This paragraph addresses that “nothing in this covenant shall be 
interpreted as implying for any […] group or person any right to engage in 
any activity […] aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms 
recognised herein […]”. However, the provision clearly aims at preventing 
a certain “interpretation” of the covenants. 
                                                 
7
 Beyond Voluntarism (2002), p. 85 for the ICSECR; Paust (2002), p. 813 and (1992), p. 55; Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999), p. 265; Clapham (1993), 
p. 97ff 
8
 Clapham (2006), p. 195ff.; Zerk (2006), p. 76ff; Joseph (2004) p. 9; Tomuschat (2003), p 90f; Beyond 
Voluntarism (2002), p. 64f, 74ff; 
9
 Paust (2002), p. 813 and (1992), p. 55; Clapham (1993), p. 97ff 
10
 Paust (2002), p. 813 
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The assumption that TNCs are not duty bearers under two covenants is as well affirmed 
by findings of the covenant committees: 
 
- For the ICCPR the UN Human Rights Committee found: “The Art. 2 par. 
1 obligations are binding on states and do not, as such, have direct 
horizontal effect as a matter of international law”.11 By explicitly 
excluding any “direct horizontal effect” the committee rejected the concept 
of direct obligations imposed on non-state actors such as TNCs . (A ‘direct 
horizontal effect’ implies that one non-state actor has a direct obligation 
towards another non-state actor, i.e. that rights exists which can be directly 
relied on between private parties.) The committee considers the ICCPR as 
having solely direct vertical effects between states and non-state actors 
under their jurisdiction.  
- For the ICESCR the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
(CESCR) confirmed in several comments that “only States are parties to 
the Covenant and are thus ultimately accountable for compliance with 
it”.12 With respect the right to work the committee finally even confirmed: 
“private enterprises - national and multinational - [are] not bound by the 
Covenant - […].13 
Conclusion: ICCPR and ICESCR do not contain direct obligations of TNCs. 
2.1.2 ICCPR and ICESCR and Indirect Obligations of TNCs by Positive 
Obligations of State Parties 
ICCPR and ICESCR contain ‘corporate human rights standards’, by imposing indirect 
obligations on TNCs by conferring the ‘positive obligation’ on the state parties to 
prevent (and if appropriate also investigate and punish) the impairment of covenants 
rights by private actors such as TNCs: 
                                                 
11
 Human Rights Committee; General Comment No. 31, par. 8 
12
 CESCR, General Comment No. 12, par. 20; No. 14, par. 42; No. 18, par. 52 
13
 CESCR, General Comment No. 18, par. 52 
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- Art. 2 (1) ICCPR obliges states “to respect” end “to ensure” the covenant 
rights. That includes ‘negative’ as well as ‘positive’ obligations of states.14 
In order to “respect” the covenant rights, states have to refrain from any 
violation of those rights (‘negative obligation’), “to ensure” the covenant 
rights states must take positive action, in particular with respect to private 
actor abuses: “The positive obligation on state parties to ensure covenant 
rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the state 
[…] also against acts committed by private persons and entities so far as 
they are amenable to application between private persons or entities”.15 
Scope and content of positive obligations vary from right to right. Positive 
obligations can comprise measures to “prevent, punish, investigate or 
redress” private actor abuses.16 In order to determine what kind of 
measures a state is obliged to take, a ‘due diligence test’ is suggested 
according to which a state has to take ‘reasonable and serious steps’.17 
- ICCPR rights, which have been identified by the Human Rights 
Committee as requiring positive action, are: The ‘right to life’ (Art. 6),18 
‘freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment ‘(Art. 7),19 
‘equality of rights between men and women’ (Art. 3),20 ‘human treatment 
of persons deprived of liberty’ (Art. 10),21 ‘freedom of movement’ 
(Art. 12),22 privacy related guarantees (Art. 17),23 ‘right to freedom of 
expression’ (Art. 19)24 and the rights of the child (Art. 24)25.  
                                                 
14
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 par. 6  
15
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 par. 8 
16
 Human Rights Committee Comment Nr. 31 par. 8 
17
 Beyond Voluntarism (2002), p .52 
18
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 6 par. 2 
19
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31 par. 8, No. 20 par. 2 
20
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 28 par. 3 
21
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 21 par. 2 
22
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 27 par. 6 
23
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31 par. 8 
24
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 10 par. 2 
25
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 17 par. 6 
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- According to Art. 2 (1) ICESCR “Each state […] undertakes to take steps 
[…] to the maximum of its available resources […] to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present 
covenant […]”. The wording “to take steps” clearly marks the obligation 
to take positive action. According to the ‘Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, the ICESCR requires 
states “to protect the covenant rights”, which includes the “states’ 
responsibility to ensure that […] transnational corporations over which 
they exercise jurisdiction, do not deprive individuals of their [covenant] 
rights”26. Scope and content of the “positive obligations” vary from right 
to right, and additionally depend on the “available resources” of each state 
(Art. 2 (1) ICESCR). As for the ICCPR the ‘due diligence test’ applies. 
- Areas in which the positive obligation of states to prevent the impairment 
of ICESCR rights by private actors has already been given special 
attention by the CESCR are: The ‘right to food’ (Art. 11),27 the ‘right to 
work’ (Art. 6),28 the ‘right to social security’ (Art. 9),29 intellectual 
property related rights (Art. 15 (1) (c)),30 family related rights (Art. 10)31 
and the ‘right to adequate housing’ (Art. 11)32. 
Conclusion: By obliging states to prevent (and if appropriate also punish) private actor 
abuses of covenant rights, ICCPR and ICESCR contain indirect human rights 
obligations for TNCs  
                                                 
26
 §§ 6 and 18 Maastricht Guidelines 
27
 CESCR, General Comment No. 12, par. 19, 27 
28
 CESCR, General Comment No. 18 
29
 CESCR, General Comment No. 19, par. 46 
30
 CESCR, General Comment No. 17, par. 55 
31
 CESCR, General Comment No. 16, par. 27 
32
 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, par. 9 
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2.2 Corporate Standards in Customary Human Rights Law and Jus Cogens 
2.2.1 Direct Obligations of TNCs under Customary Human Rights Law and Jus 
Cogens 
This thesis will distinguish between ‘ordinary customary human rights law’ and ‘jus 
cogens’. 
‘Ordinary Customary Human Rights Law’:  
Customary human rights rules have evolved primarily from norms which are universal 
in character and proclaimed in international instruments such as the ICCPR, ICESCR 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).33 A growing consensus 
amongst scholars indicates that provisions which have entered into customary law are: 
The prohibitions on genocide, slavery, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment, piracy, crimes against humanity, war crimes, arbitrary killing, 
prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial and religious discrimination.34 
Additionally, prominent voices include as well ‘any consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognised human rights’.35 
It is subject to debate whether international customary human rights law contains direct 
obligations for TNCs. The preamble of the UDHR requiring “ […] that every individual 
and every organ of society […] shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms […] to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance […]” (emphasis added) has often led to the interpretation 
the UDHR would apply directly to TNCs as ‘organs of society’.36 However, so far there 
is no evidence available for widespread and consistent state practice suggesting that 
those provisions of the UDHR which have turned into customary law would directly 
bind TNCs. Likewise there is no state practice suggesting that other treaty provisions 
                                                 
33
 Clapham (2006), p. 86; Beyond Voluntarism (2002), p. 60 
34
 U.S. Third Restatements (1987) sec. 702; Clapham (2006), p. 86; Cassese (2005), p. 393ff; Joseph 
(2004), p. 9; Tomuschat (2003), p. 35f; Beyond Voluntarism (2002), p. 60ff, Hannum (1995/1996), p. 
317ff 
35
 U.S. Third Restatements (1987) sec. 702; Cassese (2005), p. 394 
36
 Beyond Voluntarism (2002), p. 58ff; Henkin (1999), p. 25 
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which have become binding customary law (such as provisions from the ICCPR or the 
ICESCR) would bind TNCs directly.37 
Conclusion: ‘Ordinary customary human rights law’ does not contain direct obligations 
for TNCs. 
‘Jus Cogens’: 
Direct obligations of TNCs could derive from ‘jus cogens’. The concept of jus cogens 
is implied in Art. 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as 
“peremptory norm[s] of general international laws, which are “accepted and recognised 
by the international community of states as a whole as [a] norm[s] from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law have the same character”.  Today, the existence of jus cogens 
is increasingly accepted amongst states (the VCLT has been ratified by over 100 states), 
and affirmed also in jurisdiction and literature.38 In the context of human rights a clear 
tendency exists to include into the corpus of jus cogens norms prohibitions on:39  
- genocide 
- slavery 
- torture and cruel inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 
- crimes against humanity 
- war crimes 
- arbitrary killing 
- systematic racial and religious discrimination 
- right to self-determination 
- arbitrary deprivations of life and liberty. 
                                                 
37
 Beyond Voluntarism (2002), p. 74 
38
 ICYT, Furundzija, 10.12.1998, par. 156 ; ICJ, Nicaragua, 27.06.1986, par. 190 ; Cassese (2005), p. 
199ff; Shaw (2003), p. 117ff; 
39
 ICTY, Furundzija, 10.12.1998, par. 154; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, 
par. 11; Commentary on the ILCs Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 26 par. 5, Art. 40 par. 3ff 
(Report of the ILC, GAOR, Supp. No. 10 (A56/10); Clapham (2006), p. 88; Cassese (2005), p. 202f; 
Beyond Voluntarism (2002), p. 62;  
 14
Moreover, there is a consensus on the notion that jus cogens norms bind not only states 
but also non-state actors.40 This assumption has mostly been referred to in the context 
of criminal responsibility of individuals.41 However, a growing majority advocates that 
all subjects of international law are directly bound by jus cogens norms.42 This notion 
finds support in reasoning and wording of the ICTY Furundzija case: “[…] the 
prohibition of torture is an absolute value from which nobody must deviate” (emphasis 
added).43 The recognises ‘absolute’ values from which ‘nobody’ must deviate. This 
implies that, consequently, all subjects of international law which (by their nature) have 
the ability to “deviate from” these absolute values are prohibited to violate the values. 
TNCs as legal entities, having not only legal personality but also the capacity to make 
decisions and to act as entity, are in general capable of violating the above-mentioned 
jus cogens rules (especially since also states as abstract entities are considered as being 
able to violate those rules). Hence, it can be argued that TNCs - as subjects of 
international law and potential violators of jus cogens norms - are directly bound by the 
jus cogens law.  
Moreover, the concept of jus cogens - though controversially debated in detail - is 
considered to imply that jus cogens norms: 
- apply to all subjects of international law (see above) 
- bind all states regardless if they are member to human right treaties44  
- cannot be derogated from45  
- make treaties with conflicting content void46 
- have erga-omnes character47 
                                                 
40
 Clapham (2006), p. 90; Hobe/Kimminich (2004), p. 173; Ramasastry (2002), p. 94; Liability of 
Multinational Corporations under International Law (2000), p. 8; ICYT, Furundzija, 10.12.1998, par. 
154 for the prohibition of torture 
41
 For example: ICTY, Furundzija, 10.12.1998, par. 153ff 
42
 Hobe/Kimminich (2004), p. 173; Explicitly for TNCs: Clapham (2006), p. 90;  Ramasastry (2002), p. 
94; Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law (2000), p. 8 
43
 ICTY, Furundzija, 10.12.1998, par. 154 
44
 Hobe/Kimminich (2004), p. 173; Parker (1988/1989), p. 418 
45
 Art. 53 VCLT; Cassese (2005), p 205; Clapham (2006), p. 87ff, Parker (1988/1989), p. 416 
46
 Art. 53 VCLT 
47
 Hobe/Kimminich (2004), p. 174; Byers (1997), p. 236 
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- allow for universal jurisdiction48 
Conclusion: The rules having jus cogens character directly bind TNCs. 
2.2.2 Indirect Obligations of TNCs  by Positive Obligations of States under 
Customary Human Rights Law and Jus Cogens Law 
Moreover, it needs to be discussed whether customary human rights law, in particular 
jus cogens, contains indirect obligations for TNCs by imposing the positive obligation 
on states to prevent private actor abuse. This question has neither in jurisprudence nor 
amongst scholars gotten much attention. Some scholars held that customary human 
rights law, in particular jus cogens law, would carry mainly negative obligations.49 
Others advocate a wider approach and point at the ‘need’ to include positive obligations 
into customary human rights law.50  
As far as ‘ordinary customary human rights law’ is concerned, the scope of ‘binding 
custom’ is not governed by factors like ‘needs‘ or an ‘effet utile’ approach. It depends 
solely on (‘opinio juris’ based) state practice. However, it seems that presently no 
sufficient evidence is available in state practice for the firm assumption that customary 
obligations would extent to positive obligations.  
 
For jus cogens rules it is as well very uncertain whether they extent to the positive the 
obligation of states to prevent private actor abuses. Neither Art. 53 VCLT, nor judicial 
decisions of international courts or literature on jus cogens clearly indicate that the 
concept of jus cogens would necessarily imply positive obligations for states: 
According to the commentators, jus cogens merely 'allows’ for universal jurisdiction, 
however no indication exists for any obligation to exercise jurisdiction (such as implied 
in positive obligations).51 Likewise also the ICTY stated its Furundzija case: “ […] one 
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of the consequences of the jus cogens character […] is that every state is entitled to 
investigate, prosecute, punish or extradite individuals accused of [the violation of a jus 
cogens norm]” (emphasis added).52 Only very few attempts exist which explicitly 
advocate the jus cogens concept would also imply particular positive obligations of 
states, as for example ‘the obligation to contribute to the universal suppression’ of jus 
cogens prohibitions by not lending refuge on state territory to perpetrators who cannot 
be extradited,53 or the obligation to not grant impunity to perpetrators if the violation 
was committed within a states territorial jurisdiction.54  
 
As demonstrated, it is at present nowhere advocated explicitly that jus cogens would 
imply positive obligations of states. However, when taking an ‘effet utile’ perspective 
into consideration, it seems nevertheless possible to derive positive obligations from the 
jus cogens concept (at least with respect to private actor abuses of such private actors 
that are under the jurisdiction of a state): Jus cogens rules are “absolute values”. 
However, a sufficient protection of such core values is only possible and effective 
(‘effet utile’) if states are obliged to also prevent private actor abuses.  In addition 
positive obligations are necessary, since states also could, otherwise, easily escape their 
negative (jus cogens) obligations by delegation public tasks to private actors. 
 
Conclusion: There is not enough evidence for the assumption ‘ordinary customary 
human rights law’ would contain positive obligation on states. Likewise it is uncertain 
whether jus cogens necessarily implies positive obligations of states. However, based 
on ‘effet utile’ considerations it seems possible to construct the positive obligation of 
states to prevent human rights abuses by such private actors which are subject to their 
jurisdiction. 
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2.3 Enforcement of ‘Corporate Human Rights Standards’ by Host States 
The positive obligation’ of states ‘to prevent TNCs from abusing human rights (see 
section 2.1.2 and 2.2.2) applies first and foremost territorially (a possible additional 
extraterritorial scope of ‘positive obligations’ will be discussed in section 5.4.2). For the 
‘thesis scenario’ that implies that host states have to control the business activities of 
TNCs conducted on their territory. However, for several reasons not all host states 
control TNC business activities on their territory sufficiently. For the purpose of this 
thesis, a distinction will be made between three categories:  
‘Lacking capacity’ to control TNCs sufficiently:  
- Lacking capacity to control TNCs sufficiently can have different origins, 
such as a lack of: financial means, knowledge, human resources, 
infrastructure or administrative and enforcement structures. In particular 
developing countries often lack the capacity to control TNCs. 
- ‘Lacking capacity’ can result in a lack of binding corporate human rights 
standards (for example if even the capacity to set up legal standards is 
lacking). However, it can as well be that sufficient legal standards even 
exist, but that a host state lacks the capacity to enforce them.  
- In cases of ‘lacking capacity’ host states have not made the political choice 
to not prevent human rights abuses by TNCs sufficiently (i.e. in a higher 
level). The ‘low level’ of efficient control of TNCs can, therefore, not be 
considered an ‘explicit policy’ of a host state. 
‘Lacking willingness’ to control TNCs sufficiently:  
- ‘Lacking willingness’ of host states to control TNCs can have different 
backgrounds: In particular developing states depend highly on foreign 
investments and compete with other (developing) states to attract foreign 
investors. This competitive pressure can result in a reluctance to set up (or 
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to enforce) corporate human rights standards.55 Reluctance to set up 
corporate standards can also result from investment treaties host states are 
often bound to. These treaties (providing for ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
and ‘full protection and security’ of foreign investors) have sometimes 
been interpreted as protecting foreign investors also from losses resulting 
from certain political decisions of host states. Hence, host states might be 
afraid such treaty provisions could be invoked when they enforce such 
corporate human rights standards that cause profit losses for TNCs.56  
- Lacking willingness can result either in a lack of binding corporate human 
rights standards, or in a lack of enforcement of existing standards.  
- In cases of ‘lacking willingness’ host states have usually made the political 
decision not to protect human rights on a higher level. Thus, the chosen 
level of human rights protection has to be considered as an ‘explicit 
policy’ of that state. 
‘Lacking interest’ in controlling TNCs: 
- In cases of simple ‘lacking interest’ in controlling TNCs, the lack of 
sufficient corporate human rights standards is neither a consequence of 
lacking capacities nor of a explicit political decision, but rather results 
from a complete lack of interest in dealing with corporate human rights 
issues. Indication for ‘lacking interest’ is that no evidence of any political 
discussion or decision is available, such as for example political 
statements, formulated political programs, or records of political decision 
making procedures.  
2.4 Conclusion 
International law contains ‘corporate human rights standards’ in form of direct 
obligations of TNCs only as far as jus cogens norms are concerned. However, 
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ICCPR and ICESCR contain ‘corporate human rights standards’ indirectly by 
imposing the positive obligation on states to prevent private actors from impairing 
the covenant rights. In addition, a positive obligation of states to prevent private 
actor abuse of human rights can also be constructed for the field of jus cogens. 
Sometimes host states do not enforce these ‘corporate human rights standards’ 
sufficiently. This thesis distinguished between cases of ‘lacking capacity’, 
‘lacking willingness’ and ‘lacking interest’ of host states.  
 20
 
3 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in International Law 
Since host states often do not sufficiently enforce the ‘corporate human rights 
standards’ deriving from international human rights law, the possibility of enforcement 
of such standards by means of extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by home states of 
TNCs has attracted attention. This section will give an overview over the ‘tool 
extraterritorial jurisdiction’. 
3.1 The Extraterritorial Elements in the ‘Thesis Scenario’ 
As explained in the introduction this thesis is limited to ‘extraterritorial legislative 
jurisdiction’ (from now on referred to as ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction).  Legislative 
jurisdiction is ‘extraterritorial’ when states apply their domestic law on cases involving 
a  foreign element.  In the ‘thesis scenario’ home states apply their domestic law (which 
contains ‘corporate human rights standards’) to TNCs (be it to the foreign subsidiary or 
to the TNC parent company). Foreign elements first and foremost arise from these 
aspects: 
- The place of incorporation of the TNC-subsidiaries (whose business 
activities might impair human rights in the host state) is a foreign state (the 
host state). 
- The business activities of the TNC-subsidiaries and the individuals whose 
human rights are (potentially) impaired are located within the territory of a 
foreign state (the host state) and, thus, in general under the territorial 
supremacy of that state. 
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3.2 Bases for Jurisdiction in International Law 
In international law the rules governing jurisdiction (‘bases for jurisdiction’) are 
traditionally identified in form of ‘principles’ on which jurisdiction is commonly based 
on.
57
 They are as such not determined in a particular treaty, but derive from the 
principle of sovereignty and have evolved in state practice. Today, the principles are 
reflected in several treaties, and have been (with differences in extent and detail) 
confirmed by international tribunals. The base for territorial jurisdiction, i.e. the 
jurisdiction which states exercise with respect to their territory, is the ‘territorial 
principle’. For extraterritorial jurisdiction, international law acknowledges several 
additional bases such as the ‘nationality principle’, the ‘passive personality principle’, 
the ‘universality principle’, the ‘protective principle’ and the ‘effects doctrine’.  
 
In scenarios as the ‘thesis scenario’ home states might be able to base extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over TNCs on several of the internationally acknowledged bases. However, 
the thesis will be strictly limited to such extraterritorial jurisdiction that is based on the 
‘active nationality principle’ (‘nationality-based jurisdiction’), i.e. on the assertion 
that the TNC (be it the parent company or the subsidiary) is a national of the home state 
and is, therefore, subject to its jurisdiction. This section will, therefore, not elaborate on 
other bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction than the active nationality principle. 
However, since nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction of home states potentially 
conflicts with the territorial supremacy of host states, and thus, with their territorial 
jurisdiction, the territorial principle will be discussed first. 
3.2.1 The Territorial Principle 
According to the ‘territorial principle’ each state has jurisdiction to regulate all things, 
events and individuals, corporations and other entities within the limits of its territory.58 
The principle applies to all fields of law.59 It has its foundation in the principle of 
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sovereignty, and it reflects the global communities recognition that a state could not 
exist without the power to control acts, things and persons on its territory.60 In addition, 
the ‘effects doctrine’ is often conceived as also belonging to the territorial principle. It 
asserts jurisdiction of a state over activities outside its territory which have, or are 
intended to have, substantial effects within its territory.61 However, though territorial 
jurisdiction is usually considered to be absolute, it is not necessarily exclusive, since 
other states can as well have jurisdiction over certain matters (extraterritorial 
jurisdiction) if they can invoke one of the above-mentioned internationally 
acknowledged bases. In the ‘thesis scenario’ the host states have territorial jurisdiction 
over the individuals, abstract entities and (business) activities on their territory. If and to 
what extent home states can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over business activities 
conducted in host states will be subject to the following sections. 
3.2.2 Active Nationality Principle 
The ‘active nationality principle’ (also: ‘nationality principle’) is the base for the so-
called ‘nationality-based jurisdiction’. According to the nationality principle a state may 
regulate the activities, interests, status or relations of its nationals not only inside but 
also outside its territory.62 The principle is affirmed by consistent widespread state 
practice,63 and is reflected in several treaties.64 In practice it has often been invoked by 
civil law countries in order to hold their nationals criminally accountable for crimes 
committed abroad. Common law countries have never objected to that.65   
 
With the ‘thesis scenario’ in mind, it is important to highlight that the nationality 
principle is - though traditionally mostly invoked and debated with respect to criminal 
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jurisdiction over individuals - is neither limited to criminal jurisdiction nor to 
jurisdiction over individuals.66 It can be invoked in all fields of law and applies to 
jurisdiction over individuals as well as to jurisdiction over legal entities such as TNCs: 
So, states have claimed nationality-based jurisdiction in several other fields than 
criminal jurisdiction such as e.g. for issues of marriage, divorce, inheritance or tax.67 
Furthermore, there is no obstacle inherent in international law suggesting that 
nationality-based jurisdiction was necessarily limited to criminal law. In particular the 
notion underlying the nationality principle (that nationals owe certain duties to their 
home state regardless of their current residence)68 applies to all fields of law. Likewise 
have states invoked the nationality principle also for jurisdiction over other subjects 
than individuals, such as over corporations in particular in tax law and trade control.69 It 
is generally acknowledged in international law that not only individuals but also 
corporations can be ‘nationals’ of a state.70 For further details on corporate nationality 
see section 4. 
For the ‘thesis scenario’ the active nationality principle entails the following 
implications: 
- A Home state is - in general - entitled to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over TNC entities, if the entities are nationals of that state. 
Under which circumstances home states can assert nationality of a 
corporation will be discussed in section 4.2.   
- Home states can invoke the nationality principle in all fields of law, be it 
civil, criminal or - if existing as a separate field of law - public law.  
However, international law does not allow for unlimited nationality-based 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Limitations can derive from the sovereignty of states with 
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respect to their territory. However, international law does not provide any ‘clear-cut-
limitations’. Instead, limitations need to be discussed on case-by-case basis. This thesis 
will analyse potential limitations for the ‘thesis scenario’ in section 5.2. 
3.3 Scenarios of Nationality-Based Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
In the cases as the ’thesis scenario’ home states can exercise nationality-based 
jurisdiction either over  the TNC parent company (’parent approach’) or directly over 
its foreign subsidiary (’direct approach’): 
 
‘Parent approach’:  
- Home states exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over a TNC parent 
company. They invoke the nationality principle by considering the parent 
as their national. Under which circumstances international law permits 
such nationality-assertions will be discussed in section 4.2. 
- The ‘foreign element’ in the ‘parent approach’ lies mainly in the fact that 
home states indirectly regulate the business activities of a foreign TNC 
subsidiary which conducts its business on the territory of a foreign state 
(the host state), and, thus, is subject to the territorial supremacy of that 
host state. 
- Likewise are the (potential) human rights abuses (which are to be 
prevented or punished by the extraterritorial jurisdiction) committed on 
the territory of a foreign state (the host state). 
- In the ‘parent approach’ TNC parent companies are held accountable first 
and foremost: 71 
 by attributing human rights abuses of a foreign subsidiary  to 
its parent company based on concepts such as ‘Piercing the 
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Corporate Veil’, ‘Joint Liability’ or ‘Multinational Group 
Liability’, which bypass the ‘limited liability of parent 
companies’ for activities and omissions of their subsidiaries 
(= ‘Attribution Approach’) 
 for their own ‘wrongdoing’, i.e. = liability for non-
compliance with particular human-rights-related due 
diligence obligations which were imposed on the TNC 
parents (= ‘Direct Parent Liability Approach’):  
In this approach home states oblige TNC parents to control 
and direct the business activities of their foreign subsidiaries 
in host states with respect to human rights. The obligations 
imposed on the parent companies are based on the fact that 
TNC parents, as shareholders, are entitled to exercise control 
over their subsidiaries. Instead of attributing the human rights 
abuses of subsidiaries to the parent, TNC parents are held 
accountable for their own ‘wrongdoing’ (i.e. for non-
compliance with their shareholder-based due diligence 
obligations). 
‘Direct approach’:  
- Home states exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction directly over foreign TNC 
subsidiaries. They invoke the nationality principle by considering the 
foreign subsidiaries (though incorporated in the host state) as their ‘quasi-
nationals’ since they are owned and controlled by a company (the TNC 
parents) which the home state considers to be its national. Whether 
international law permits such nationality-assertions will be discussed in 
section 4.2. 
- The ‘foreign element’ in the ‘direct approach’ lies mainly in the fact that 
home states directly apply their law on entities (the foreign subsidiaries) 
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which are incorporated under the laws of a foreign state (the host state) and 
conduct their business exclusively on the territory of that foreign state. This 
implies potential for conflicts between the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
home states and the territorial supremacy of the host states, which will be 
discussed in section 5.2. 
Fields of Law: 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction can in general be exercised in all fields of law:  
- In the field of criminal law, possible approaches reach from direct criminal 
liability of TNC entities to liability of individuals who are endowed with 
responsibility and decision making competence within the TNC, such as 
chairmen, directors, other members of the corporate management or even 
shareholders. 
- In the field of civil law, approaches are likely to focus on law of tort, 
conceived as enforcement of human rights standards by empowering 
victims (and if appropriate NGOs and other organisations acting on behalf 
of victims). Mechanisms enhancing the attractiveness of such approaches 
could be tools as class action or punitive damages. Civil action approaches 
are not necessarily limited to action for damages. They can also include 
other remedies, such as for example the filing for injunctive relief. 
- In the field of public law and other mandatory law, approaches can cover 
a wide range of means from reporting obligations for activities of foreign 
subsidiaries to mandatory corporate standards whose non-observance 
entails legal consequences for the TNCs such as sanctions, announcement 
of the non-compliance to the public, criminal liability or the removal of 
corporate, tax or other advantages. 
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4 Corporate Nationality of TNCs 
In order to base extraterritorial jurisdiction over TNC entities on the active nationality 
principle, a home state has to assert that the respective TNC entity is its national. This 
section analyses the circumstances under which international law allows such assertions 
of ‘corporate nationality’. 
4.1 The Concept of Nationality in International Law 
The concept of nationality is, prima facie, a matter to be determined by municipal law. 
The ICJ noted in the Nottebohm case that international law leaves it to every state to 
establish the rules necessary for the acquisition of its nationality.72 In absence of 
international harmonisation no coherent definition of nationality has come into being. 
There are rather various - often incoherent - regulations of nationality in the municipal 
laws of states.73 However, though emphasising the discretion of states, the ICJ stated 
that, according to state practice, nationality is “a legal bond having as its basis a social 
fact of attachment, a ‘genuine connection’ of existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties” (emphasis added) and the 
recognition that a person is “more closely connected with that state than with any 
other.”74 The ICJ distinguished between the domestic meaning of nationality, and the 
concept of nationality on the international plane: States are only under obligation to 
recognise the nationality granted or asserted by another state, when a genuine 
connection exists between a person and that state.75 
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4.2 Corporate Nationality in International Law 
The ‘concept of nationality’ has evolved with respect to individuals. However, with the 
increase in transnational trade states began to allocate nationality also to corporations, 
for example for conflict-of-law purposes, to establish jurisdiction, or to determine 
whether a state can exercise diplomatic protection.76 Corporate nationality is derived - 
but only to a limited extent - by analogy of nationality of individuals.77  
4.2.1 The ’Incorporation Test’ 
The ICJ decided upon questions of ‘corporate nationality’ for the purpose of diplomatic 
protection in the Barcelona Traction case. It found that customary law had not 
established a single genuine link test for corporate nationality: “no absolute test of the 
‘genuine connection’ has found general acceptance” (emphasis added). However, based 
on an analysis of the general principles of law the ICJ concluded that the “traditional 
rule attributes the [nationality-based] right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity 
to the state under the laws of which it has been incorporated and in whose territory it 
has its registered office”. It considered these two criteria (which are often referred to as 
‘incorporation test’)78 to be confirmed “by long practice and by numerous international 
instruments”. Finally the ICJ affirmed the Canadian nationality of the corporation in 
question since due to the “close and permanent connection” between Canada and that 
corporation (including local incorporation and the presence of a registered office).79 
Thus, the ICJ confirmed the conformity of the ‘incorporations test’ (for asserting 
‘corporate nationality’ on the international plane) with international law. 
There is not much indication that the factual situation which the ICJ described 1970 in 
its Barcelona Traction judgement has changed much: Surveys on diplomatic protection 
indicate for example that state practice has still not developed a generally accepted 
‘absolute test’ of ‘genuine connection’ between a corporation and the state asserting 
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‘corporate nationality’ (though many states require the incorporation of a corporation 
under their laws as one requirement for corporate nationality).80 Therefore, it is very 
likely that the ‘incorporation test’ (= incorporation + registered office) is still 
applicable. Thus, international tribunals would, most likely, still affirm the conformity 
of the ‘incorporation test’ with international law.81  
For the ‘thesis scenario’ this implies that a home state can, without much risk, assert 
‘corporate nationality’ of a TNC entity, if that entity is incorporated under its laws and 
has its registered office (for example the headquarter) in that state. 
4.2.2 ’Different and Further Links’ 
However, as the ICJ also noticed in its Barcelona Traction decision, some states 
consider corporate entities only as their nationals when “different or further links” exist 
than incorporation and a registered office.82 Attention is to be given to the distinction 
the ICJ drew between states asserting nationality based on ‘different’ links (i.e. on a 
different ‘base’ than incorporation), and states requiring merely ‘further’ links (i.e. 
incorporation remains the ‘base’, but additional criteria exist). Surveys in the field of 
diplomatic protection indicate that many states use the ‘incorporation test’ as ‘base’ but 
require ‘further genuine links’ to their territory, such as for example the ‘seat of the 
management’ or the place of ‘economic control‘.83 Other states, however, assert 
corporate nationality (at least for the purpose of diplomatic protection) on ‘different’ 
bases than the ‘incorporation test’ such as other genuine links, for example the seat. (i.e. 
they assert ‘corporate nationality’ even when a corporation is not incorporated under 
their laws and/or has its registered seat not on its territory). 84  
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 ‘Further Links’: 
The ICJ did not explicitly decide on the question whether it is in conformity with 
international law if states base ‘corporate nationality’ on the ‘incorporation test’ but 
require further links to the state. It found such state practice neither to be prohibited nor 
permitted by international law, but merely concluded that none of such approaches 
(‘tests’) gained general acceptance and could, thus, be considered as customary law. 
However, wording and reasoning used by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case 
suggest that local incorporation and registered office are - according to the ‘traditional 
rule’ - only the required minimum-criteria for nationality assertions on the international 
plane. There is no indication in the jurisdiction of the ICJ suggesting that state practice 
requiring further links than local incorporation and registered office would not comply 
with international law.  
For the ‘thesis scenario’ this implies that there is every indication that internationals law 
allows home states to assert ‘corporate nationality’ based on further criteria than local 
incorporation and registered office (as long as these criteria are additional to the 
‘incorporation’ test). 
‘Different links’: 
However, for the ‘thesis scenario’ it is very important whether international law permits 
nationality assertions based on ‘different links’ than the ‘incorporation test link’, such 
as the seat of a corporation (for example of a TNC parent company which is not 
registered in the same state), or on the fact that the majority or a substantial portion of 
the shares of a corporation are owned by nationals of a state (applicable for example to 
‘foreign subsidiaries’ of a TNC). Presently it is very uncertain whether ‘corporate 
nationality’ based on such criteria is permitted under international law.85 In its 
Barcelona Traction case the ICJ decided explicitly (at least for the purpose of 
diplomatic protection) that a state cannot base nationality assertions on the fact that its 
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nationals own the majority or a substantial portion of the shares of a corporation.86 In 
addition, it found that a deviation from the ‘incorporation test’ as a minimum-
requirement was only permissible once another ‘test’ (i.e. ‘genuine link’) has found 
general acceptance on the international plane.  
However, present state practice provides not much indication for the assumption that a 
generally accepted ‘test’ had occurred in the meantime according to which ‘corporate 
nationality’ is determined by criteria not including local incorporation and a local 
registered office. In particular, nationality assertions of foreign subsidiaries of nationals 
(i.e. based on the fact that the majority or a substantial portion of the shares of a 
corporation are owned by nationals of a state) have not found general acceptance in 
state practice, but have been controversial. Especially the practice of the U.S. to assert 
‘corporate nationality’ of companies which are incorporated outside the U.S., but are 
owned by U.S. citizens or by a U.S. incorporated company, has caused strong 
diplomatic protests, in particular by European states.87  
Hence, due to the afore-mentioned circumstances there is every reason to doubt that 
international law would allow nationality assertions based on the fact that nationals of a 
state hold shares in a corporation.88 There might be the tendency in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BIT) to allocate corporate nationality (for the purpose of giving access to 
‘Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)’ arbitration) to that state in which entities or persons 
who control a corporation are located.89 However, there is no indication that this 
tendency has already turned into a ‘generally accepted test’ of corporate nationality, or 
even into binding custom.90 First, it seems that states often sign BITs in order to escape 
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customary law, not to change or create it.91 And second, the nationality allocation based 
on the ‘place of control’ has remained limited to the particular issue of access to 
arbitration with regard to FDI, and has not extended to other fields where ‘corporate 
nationality’ is of crucial importance.  
Given the fact that apparently no ‘genuine link test’ has found ‘general acceptance’ yet, 
it must also be doubted that international law would allow any other ‘test’ which does 
not include the ‘incorporation test’ as minimum requirement.92 However, a counter-
argument might be that the Barcelona Traction jurisprudence (from with the 
‘incorporation test dogma’ derives) was limited to (nationality based) diplomatic 
protection of a corporation, and, therefore, might not be necessarily be decisive for 
nationality assertions for the purpose of extraterritorial jurisdiction.93 
For the thesis scenario this implies that there is notable indication for the assumption 
that international law does not allow home states to assert ‘corporate nationality’ based 
on ‘tests’ that do not include the criteria: Incorporation and registered office. Thus, in 
particular, attempts to assert ‘corporate nationality’ (or ‘quasi-nationality’) of foreign 
subsidiaries are at risk of being not in conformity with international law. 
4.2.3 ‘Dual Nationality’ 
‘Dual nationality’ (or ‘double nationality’) occurs when, at the same time, more than 
one state asserts nationality of an individual or a corporation. The concept of ‘dual 
nationality’ and its implications have been subject to many controversies on the 
international as well as on the domestic level. On the international level ‘dual 
nationality’ caused problems, has in particular in proceedings before international 
tribunals. In such proceedings the classical rule usually applies according to which the 
claimant (or the person or entity on whose behalf a state exercises diplomatic 
protection) may not possess the nationality of the state which is the defendant.94 Thus, 
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problems have arisen when a claimant (or the protected person/entity) was a national of 
the defendant state and, at the same time, a national of another state. In such situations 
tribunals either rejected the claim or determined a predominant nationality by invoking 
concepts such as ‘dominant’ or ‘effective’ nationality.95 However, neither tribunal 
decisions nor legal doctrine suggests that international law would generally prohibit 
‘dual nationality’. For the ‘thesis scenario’ this implies that in general more than one 
state can assert ‘corporate nationality’ of a TNC entity (provided they base their 
nationality assertions on an internationally acknowledged ‘test’). However,  such ‘dual 
corporate nationality’ can entail problems on the international plane, for example when 
the TNC entity (possessing ‘dual nationality) becomes claimant (or subject to 
diplomatic protection) before an international tribunal, or when two home states 
exercise conflicting nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction with respect to the 
same activity of a TNC in a host state. In the latter case the right of one home state (or 
both) to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction might be limited. However, due to 
restricted capacity this thesis will analyse only jurisdictional conflicts between the 
home state and the host state. Jurisdictional conflicts arising between two homes states 
will not be discussed.  
4.2.4 Conclusion 
State practice, international judicature and views of scholars suggest, altogether, that 
international law allows a home state to assert nationality of TNC entities which are 
incorporated under its law and have their registered office on the territory of that home 
state. Thus, in the ’thesis scenario’ home states can assert nationality of such TNC 
parent companies which are incorporated under their law and have their registered 
office on their territory. However, though still uncertain, there is severe doubts that 
international law allows a home states to assert nationality of TNC parent companies 
which are not incorporated and have no registered office in that home state. Likewise 
are home states at risk of acting in non-conformity with international law when they 
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assert nationality or ’quasi-nationality’ of foreign TNC subsidiaries which are 




5 The Right of Home States to Exercise Nationality-Based Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction? 
With focus on the ‘thesis scenario’ this section will analyse if and to what extent home 
states are allowed to exercise nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction over TNCs. 
Focus will be possible limitations deriving from the sovereignty of host states. The 
section will postulate that home states have asserted ‘corporate nationality’ of a TNC 
entity in accordance with international law. As elaborated in the previous section this 
applies first and foremost to TNC parent companies which are incorporated and have 
their registered office in a home state. However, the section will nevertheless often use 
the general terms ‘TNC’ and ‘TNC entity’ in order to underline that the section applies 
also to home states who have - though not likely to be in accordance with international 
law - asserted corporate nationality (or ‘quasi-nationality’) of a foreign TNC subsidiary. 
5.1 ‘Activities of a National’  
As elaborated in section 3.2.2, the ‘active nationality principle’ does entitle a state to 
regulate the activities, interests, status or relations of its nationals inside and outside of 
its territory. The main requirement for invoking the active nationality principle is the 
nationality of the person or corporation which is subject to the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction (section 3.2.2). However, a second requirement is that the particular 
activity, which is made subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction, is an activity of exactly 
that person or corporation.  
International law does not specify the circumstances under which states can consider an 
activity as being the activity of exactly that corporate entity over which they want to 
exercise nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the general rule 
applies, which already the PCIJ formulated in its Lotus case: With respect to 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction, states have “a wide measure of discretion which is only 
limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules [of international law]”.96 Based hereupon, it 
can be concluded that homes states are allowed to define (by municipal law) the 
circumstances under which they consider an activity to be the activity of a certain 
person or corporation. The only limitation deriving from the PCIJ Lotus decision is, that 
the concepts homes states decide to use for this purpose do not conflict with prohibitive 
rules of international law, such as prohibitive rules deriving from the sovereignty of the 
host states. The limitations of extraterritorial jurisdiction by such ‘prohibitive rules’ will 
be analysed in detail in section 5.2. However, this thesis suggests, that - beside 
respecting prohibitive rules - states are also under the obligation to base extraterritorial 
jurisdiction on a ‘reasonable link’ between the activities which are subject to the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the ‘national’, over which they exercise jurisdiction in 
the particular case. 
When home states choose the ‘direct approach’ (i.e. exercise jurisdiction directly over a 
foreign TNC subsidiary) the requirement of a ‘reasonable link’ is less of a problem, 
since subject to the jurisdiction are the business activities of exactly that foreign 
subsidiary. The same applies to the ‘direct parent liability approach’: Here jurisdiction 
is exercised over the TNC parent, and the activity subject to the jurisdiction is the 
conduct of exactly that parent (in it its role as a shareholder who has certain due 
diligence obligations with respect its subsidiaries’ activities). However, the situation is 
more unclear when home states pursue the ‘attribution approach’ (i.e. exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a TNC parent company and attribute conduct of the 
subsidiary to the parent). In this case the activities subject to the jurisdiction (exercised 
over the TNC parent) are primae facie activities of the subsidiary, which is a legally 
autonomous entity whose activities are not automatically activities of its parent 
company (doctrine of ‘limited liability of shareholders’). However, most concepts used 
within the ‘attribution approach’ (such as the ‘piercing the corporate veil approach’) are 
limited to situations in which the parent is exercising such extreme control over its 
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subsidiary, that the latter cannot be said to have any will of existence of its own, and 
that treating the parent and the subsidiary as separate entities would cause inequitable 
results.97 Those concepts are based on the notion that the activities which seem to be 
conducted by the subsidiary, actually are - due to the extraordinary level of control - 
activities of the parent. The high level of control serves as ‘reasonable link’. Thus, even 
for the ‘attribution approach’ it can be argued that the activities subject to the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction are actually activities of the TNC parent company over 
which the jurisdiction is exercised. 
In addition, this thesis advocates a dynamic interpretation of the ‘active nationality 
principle’ when applied to TNCs: Whereas individual persons act usually ‘in person’, 
legal entities such as TNCs have various ways of acting. One (very common) way is 
setting up subsidiaries to conduct business in a certain sector or region. Even though 
such subsidiaries are legally autonomous corporate entities, they nevertheless conduct 
their business in the interest and under the control of their parent company. In addition, 
parent companies usually receive the profit gained by their subsidiaries. Hence, such 
subsidiaries are in fact not really acting independently and for their own account. 
5.2 Limitations of Nationality-Based Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
5.2.1 Scenarios 
For the purpose of determining the limitations of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the 
‘thesis scenario’ three different sub-scenarios will be considered:  
- ‘Congruent standards’: The legal standards applied extraterritorially 
are congruent with the host state’s legal standards. 
- ‘Lower standards’: The host state’s legal standards are lower than the 
legal standards applied extraterritorially (but the standards do not 
conflict in such a way that only one of them can be met). 
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- ‘Conflicting standards’: The legal standards applied extraterritorially 
conflict, inevitably, with the host state’s legal standards (i.e. meeting 
extraterritorially applied standards leads to a violation of host state 
standards). 
With potential conflicts with the sovereignty of host states in mind, a further distinction 
in two categories seems advisable (for elaboration on the term ‘political choice’ and on 
the scenarios ‘lacking capacity’, ‘lacking willingness’ and ‘lacking interest’ see section 
2.3): 
- The extraterritorially applied standards harmonise with the ‘political 
choices‘ of the host state (i.e. with its law and  policies):   
This category includes cases of ‘congruent standards’ in which the 
(congruent) standards are also enforced by the host state. In this case the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is fully congruent with the law and policy of the 
homes state, and thus, with its ‘political choices’.  
Likewise included are cases of ‘lacking capacity’, i.e. (1) ‘congruent 
standards’ exist (as expression of the ‘political choice’ of the host state) 
but the host state lacks the capacity to enforce them – or (2) ‘lower 
standards’ exist but are no expression of a ‘political choice’, on the 
contrary, the host state is politically motivated to require stricter standards 
(= ‘congruent standards’) but solely lacks the capacity to set up (and 
enforce) such standards. In these two cases the ‘political motivation’ (i.e. 
the ‘political choices’; = the policies) of home and host state can be 
considered congruent. 
This thesis suggests, furthermore, to include also cases in which either the 
non-enforcement of existing ‘congruent standards’ or the maintaining of 
‘lower standards’ is motivated solely by ‘lacking interest’ of the host state 
in enforcing corporate human rights standards. In such cases the ‘lacking 
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interest’ does not express a ‘political choice’ (i.e. a policy) of the host state 
with which extraterritorial jurisdiction could be in disharmony. 
This category of scenarios will be subject to section 5.3. 
- The extraterritorially applied standards conflict with the ‘political 
choices’ of the host state (i.e. with its law or policies): 
This includes cases of ‘congruent standards’ in which the host state does 
not enforce the existing (congruent) standards due to ‘lacking willingness’ 
(i.e. as expression of an explicit ‘political choice’ not to enforce them). 
Here any attempt of extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce  standards 
(which are congruent with the existing but not enforced standards of the 
host state) would thwart the ‘political decision’ of the host state not to 
enforce its legal standards, and thus, would conflict with its policy. 
Likewise - and for the same reason - are cases of ‘lower standards’ 
included in which the host state has ‘lacking willingness’ to set up stricter 
corporate human rights standards (i.e. the host state chooses explicitly not 
to have stricter standards, for example in order to attract foreign 
investment).  
Included are furthermore all cases of ‘conflicting standards’. Legal 
standards are always an expression of a ‘political choice’, thus, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction which inevitably conflicts with the host state’s 
legal standards always implies a conflict with the host state’s explicit 
‘political choices’ i.e. with its policy. 
This category of scenarios will be subject to section 5.4. 
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5.2.2 ‘Prohibitive Rules’ 
Undisputed, the nationality principle does not allow unlimited extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, but is limited by international law.98 However, there is less clarity on 
content and details of the limitations. The PCIJ stated in its Lotus case with respect to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, that states have “a wide measure of discretion which is only 
limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules [of international law]”.99 Two principles of 
international law which can amount to ‘prohibitive rules’ are:100 
- The ‘principle of sovereign equality of states (from here on referred to as 
‘sovereignty principle’) as laid down in Art. 2 (1) UN Charta and in the 6th 
principle of the Friendly Relations Declaration. According to the latter it 
includes: “Each state has the right freely to choose and develop its 
political, social, economical and cultural systems”. 
- The ‘principle of non-intervention’: It is part of customary international 
law and includes that “no state […] has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal […] affairs of any other 
state […]” and “every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, 
economic, social and cultural development without interference in any 
form by another State”.101  
The content of the principles sovereignty and non-intervention has remained rather 
vague.102 The principles are closely linked with each other. With particular reference to 
their above-mentioned content (as it is formulated in the Friendly Relations Declaration 
and ICJ Nicaragua decision) the tentative conclusion can be drawn that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction must not:  
                                                 
98
 PCIJ, Lotus, 7.9.1927, p. 19; Buergenthal/Murphy (2007), p.  224f; Watson (1992), p.  67;  Extra-
Territorial Application of Laws and Responses Thereto, p. 6, Mann (1984), p. 59; Bowett (1983), p.7; 
15ffb  Akehurst (1974), p. 179; 188f, Mann (1964), p. 90 
99
 PCIJ, Lotus, 7.9.1927, p. 19 
100
 Bowett (1983), p. 15f 
101
 ICJ, Nicaragua, 27.6.1986, p. 108; 3rd Principle in the Friendly Relations Declaration 
102
 Bowett (1983), p. 17 
 41
- ‘interfere’103  
- with the ‘political choices’ a host state has made104 with respect to its “political, 
social, economical or cultural systems and their development”.105  
‘Political choices’: ‘Political choices’ of a state are conscious political decisions of that 
state, they are made by the decisions makers in charge, and are based on a decision 
making process (which does not necessarily need to be democratic). They can find their 
expression in legal standards, but can also be expressed by other means such as in 
political statements or political programs. This thesis advocated that ‘lacking capacity’ 
and ‘lacking interest’ are no expression of political choices (see section 2.3). 
‘Political, social, economical or cultural systems and their development’: The precise 
content of ‘political, social, economical or cultural systems and their development’ has 
remained very vague. However, this thesis suggests that binding corporate standards 
prescribed by a state, and other explicit ‘political choices’ of a state106 which regard 
corporate standards (for example the choice not to prescribe or enforce any corporate 
standards), are ‘political choices’ with respect to the ‘political, social, economical or 
cultural system’ of that state, because: Binding corporate standards are without doubt a 
determinant for the ‘economical system’ of a state. In addition, binding corporate 
standards (i.e. the ‘freedom’ granted to corporations) is also a determinant for the 
‘political system’ of a state, since it is an expression of how ‘liberal’ a state’s system is. 
‘Economic liberalism’ is, today, considered a political philosophy. 
Interference: When exactly extraterritorial measures ‘interfere’ with the ‘political 
choices’ of a state, has likewise remained vague. According to the classical doctrine on 
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international jurisdiction, international law requires that legal standards which are 
applied extraterritorially on activities conducted on the territory of another state: 
- do not inevitably conflict with the legal standards of that state107 
- do not thwart the policy of that state108  
Based hereupon, this thesis concludes with respect to possible ‘interferences’ in the 
‘thesis scenario’:  
- Extraterritorial measures of home states enforcing a situation (in a host 
state) which inevitably conflicts with the legal standards of that host state, 
‘interfere’ with the host state’s ‘political choice’ contained in its legal 
standards. This applies to all ‘conflicting standards’ scenarios. 
- Extraterritorial measures prohibiting activities (in a host state) which are - 
according to explicit policies of that host state - evidently conceived as 
permitted, or which are at least intentionally tolerated, ‘interfere’ with the 
host state’s ‘political choice’: In such cases extraterritorial jurisdiction 
thwarts the explicit policy of that host state not to have stricter corporate 
standards. This applies to all cases gathered in the category 
“extraterritorially applied standards conflict with the ‘political choices’ of 
the host state (i.e. with its law or policies)”. For a definition of the 
category see section 5.2.1). 
- All scenarios of the category “extraterritorially applied standards harmonise 
with the ‘political choices‘ of the host state (i.e. with its law and policies) do not 
‘interfere’ with ‘political choices’ of the host state. For a definition of the 
category see section 5.2.1). 
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5.2.3 ’Reasonableness’ 
Besides ‘prohibitive rules’, it is often suggested that extraterritorial jurisdiction would 
also be unlawful under international law if it is ‘unreasonable’.109 However, it is 
unclear whether the advocators of this ‘rule of reason’ consider the ‘unreasonableness 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction’ to be the only limitation by international law,110 or 
whether the ‘reasonableness’ is supposed to be considered in addition to ‘prohibitive 
rules’. Due to lacking capacity, this thesis will be based on the notion that the 
‘reasonableness’ is a criterion which has to be considered in addition to possible 
‘prohibitive rules’ 
What factors exactly determine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is ‘reasonable’ is 
unclear. According to the U.S. Third Restatements (1987), sec. 403 [2] the relevant 
factors for determining ‘reasonableness’ include (amongst other factors): 
- The connections (such as nationality) between the regulating state and the 
person responsible for the activity. 
- The importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or 
economic system. 
With respect to such kinds of extraterritorial jurisdiction over parent companies, which 
directly or indirectly, address activities of foreign subsidiaries of the parent companies, 
the U.S. Third Restatements (1987) state in sec. 414 [418] that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is only in exceptional cases ‘reasonable’, depending on (amongst several 
criteria): 
- Whether the regulation is in potential or actual conflict with the law or 
policy of the state where the subsidiary is established. 
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5.2.4 Human Rights Context 
Furthermore, when determining the limitations of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the 
‘thesis scenario’, it is necessary to be aware of the human rights context: Home states 
aim at enforcement of internationally acknowledged ‘corporate human rights standards’ 
by extraterritorial jurisdiction. This human rights background needs to be taken into 
consideration when analysing the limitations deriving from international law (see 
particularly section 5.4.1 – 5.4.5). 
5.3 The Extraterritorially Applied Standards Harmonise with the ‘Political 
Choices’ (i.e. Law and Policies) of the Host State 
The application of ‘extraterritorial standards which harmonise with the ‘political 
choices of the host state’ (for elaboration of this category see section 5.2.1) can be 
limited if this kind of extraterritorial jurisdiction does not comply with the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention (‘prohibitive rules’), or is ‘unreasonable’. 
As discussed in section 5.2.2, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention imply 
that extraterritorial jurisdiction must not ‘interfere’ with the ‘political choices’ a host 
state has made with respect to its “political, social, economical or cultural systems and 
their development”. It was also already elaborated in section 5.2.2 that all scenarios in 
which extraterritorial measures of home states harmonise with the ‘political choices‘ 
(i.e. law and  explicit policies) of the host state do not ‘interfere’ with ‘political choices’ 
the host state has made with respect to its “political, social, economical or cultural 
systems and their development”. Thus, these scenarios are in conformity with the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Furthermore, these scenarios of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction can also be considered as being ‘reasonable’: As already 
stated in section 5.2.3, two factors for determining the reasonableness of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction are ‘the importance of the [extraterritorial] regulation to the international 
political, legal or economic system’, and ‘whether the regulation is in actual or 
potential conflict with the law or the policy of the state where a subsidiary is 
established’. As already discussed, the scenarios subject to this section are not in ‘actual 
or potential conflict with the law or the policy’ of a host state. Moreover, it can be 
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argued that the extraterritorial jurisdiction is of great importance to the ‘international 
political system’, since it aims at the enforcement of internationally acknowledged 
human rights standards whose values are considered to be universal and of major 
importance to the international community.  
Conclusion: According to the interpretative approach of this thesis, all scenarios in 
which the extraterritorial application of corporate standards harmonise with the 
‘political choices‘ of the host state, can be considered to be in conformity with 
international law.  
5.4 The Extraterritorially Applied Standards Conflict with the ‘Political 
Choices’ (i.e. Law and Policies) of the Host State 
Limitations of those scenarios in which the extraterritorial application of legal standards 
conflicts with ‘political choices‘ of a host state (for elaboration on this category see 
section 5.2.1) can as well derive from the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention, and from the ‘rule of reason’. As elaborated in section 5.2.2, the principles 
of sovereignty and non-intervention imply that extraterritorial jurisdiction must not 
‘interfere’ with the ‘political choices’ a host state has made with respect to its “political, 
social, economical or cultural systems and their development”. It was also already 
elaborated in section 5.2.2 that all scenarios in which “extraterritorially applied 
standards conflict with the ‘political choices’ of the host state (i.e. with its law or 
policies)” - primae facie - ‘interfere’ with ‘political choices’ a host state has made with 
respect to its “political, social, economical or cultural systems and their development”, 
in particular with its choice not to establish (or not to enforce) stricter corporate 
standards. Hence, the classical doctrine on international jurisdiction would tend to 
consider the scenarios subject to this section to be - primae facie - a violation of 
international law and, thus, impermissible. 
However, the classical doctrine on international jurisdiction applies to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in general and does not take any particularities into consideration that arise 
from the human rights context of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the ‘thesis scenario’ 
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(see section 5.2.4). Hence, it needs to be analysed if and to what extent host states can 
invoke the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in cases where extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is primae facie illegal (because it conflicts with the host state’s law or 
policy) but aims at enforcement of internationally acknowledged human rights 
standards. The following subsection will, therefore, discuss whether the question of 
‘permissibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction’ needs to be reconsidered when 
extraterritorial jurisdiction aims at the enforcement of internationally acknowledged 
human rights standards. Due to the limited capacity of this thesis, the thesis will 
assume that the human rights standards which the home state enforces, are congruent 
with the human rights standards which the host state is obliged to protect within its 
territory. Such positive obligations of host states can either derive from human rights 
treaties the host state is party to (in this thesis limited to ICCPR and ICESCR) or from 
customary human rights law (in particular jus cogens), for details see section 2.1 and 
2.2.  
5.4.1 The Principles of Sovereignty and Non-Intervention in the Context of 
Human Rights 
The principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are limited in their application to 
certain matters which - under international law - are considered ‘internal affairs’ of a 
state.111 ‘Internal affairs’ are matters in which a state is not bound to any rules of 
international law,112 and, thus, has exclusive jurisdiction, and no other state is allowed 
to intervene.113 The concept of ‘internal affairs’ is a relative one, since the crucial factor 
for determining the scope of ‘internal affairs’ is whether a matter is subject to 
international law. However, international law has changed enormously and has 
extended into many areas which in former times had been considered ‘internal affairs’. 
In the last 60 years international law has also extended into the field of human rights. 
Hence, matters involving human rights are no longer purely internal matters. 
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In the ‘thesis scenario’ extraterritorial jurisdiction aims at enforcement of such human 
rights standards which a host state is - by international law - obliged to assure within its 
territory. Hence, the extraterritorial jurisdiction does not address matters which are 
beyond reach of international law. Thus, the matters the extraterritorial jurisdiction 
addresses (corporate human rights standards in a host state) are not purely ‘internal 
affairs’, so that the host state can not fully invoke the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention. However, international law does not provide a clear-cut answer to the 
question to which extent host states nevertheless can invoke these two principles as 
‘prohibitive rules’ limiting extraterritorial jurisdiction of home states.  
 
This thesis suggests that the right of (host) states to invoke the principles of sovereignty 
and of non-intervention in matters that are not purely ‘internal affairs’, is not 
completely nullified, but limited. A complete deprivation of the right to invoke the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention would misconceive the utmost 
importance of the concept of sovereignty within the community of states, and 
furthermore undermine the elaborate concepts and mechanisms international law 
provides for cases in which states are in breach with international law. However, to 
which extent is the right of states to invoke the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention, in matters that are not purely ‘internal affairs’, limited? The thesis 
suggests two different approaches: 
 
- Approach 1: In matters which are not purely ‘internal affairs’ but subject 
to international law, states have - according to approach 1 - to accept such 
‘interferences’ which the international law (to which they have consented 
to - explicitly provides for (for example in human rights law or in the law 
on state responsibility). However, this approach strongly focuses on 
territorial sovereignty of the host states, and neglects other sovereignty-
related interests such as the interest of home states in exercising 
jurisdiction over their nationals. Such a clear predominance of territorial 
sovereignty over other sovereignty-related aspects is not reflected in 
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international law. Hence, this thesis will suggest another approach 
(‘approach 2’). The next sections will nevertheless - as required by 
‘approach 1’ - analyse whether international human rights law, or the law 
on state responsibility, might allow home states to enforce internationally 
acknowledged human rights by nationality-based extraterritorial 
jurisdiction (see sections 5.4.2 – 5.4.4). 
- Approach 2: This approach is likewise based on the general notion that the 
sovereignty of a state is limited to that extent to which the state has 
subordinated matters to international law. Thus, it can be argued, that by 
consenting to international rules on a particular matter states have 
subordinated their sovereignty (and, thus, also their right to exclusive 
jurisdiction on that matter) to the particular content of the international law 
governing this matter. Hence, it seems - at least as a ‘thought experiment’ - 
possible to argue that, as a consequence, states loose the right to invoke 
(on the international plane) any domestic law or policy on such a matter if 
the domestic law or policy is not in conformity with the human obligations 
standards the state has consented to. Thus, international standards can, on 
the international plane, ‘override’ domestic law and policies. This 
approach does neither turn the international standards into law directly 
applicable within that state, nor does it imply that the state has to tolerate 
any kind of intervention by other states. The effect the 
‘internationalisation’ of a matter has, is solely limited to the deprivation of 
the right to invoke certain domestic laws or policies on the international 
plane, be it before an international tribunal, or with respect to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction other states are (according to internationally 
acknowledged ‘bases’ for extraterritorial jurisdiction) entitled to exercise. 
For the ‘thesis scenario’ (in particular for those scenarios in which the 
extraterritorial application of legal standards conflicts with the law or 
policy of a host state) this implies: When home states enforce exactly 
those human rights standards which a host is by international law obliged 
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to ensure, the host state cannot invoke any domestic law or policies which 
require, allow or tolerate lower human rights standards. I.e. with regard to 
nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction of home states, a host state’s 
domestic law and policy which do not meet its international obligations 
(and therefore conflict with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the home 
state) can be considered as if it would not exist. In these cases, scenarios of 
extraterritorial jurisdictions which de facto conflict with the law or policy 
of a host state, can - with respect to the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention - be treated the same way as the scenarios in which 
extraterritorial jurisdiction harmonises with the host state’s law and policy 
(see section 5.3). 
In conclusion: ‘Corporate human rights standards’ within the territory of host states are 
not purely ‘internal affairs’ of the host states, since host states are by international 
human rights law, obliged to ensure certain ‘corporate human rights standards’. 
Therefore, host states cannot fully invoke the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention when extraterritorial jurisdiction of home states aims at enforcement of 
‘corporate human rights standards’. To which extent the right of host states to invoke 
the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention is limited is uncertain. One could 
argue that host states only have to tolerate nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction 
if this is provided for in international human rights law, or in the law on state 
responsibility. However, this thesis argues for another approach, according to which 
host states are deprived of their right to invoke (on the international plane) such 
domestic law and policy that are not in conformity with its international human rights 
obligations (and therefore conflict with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the home 
state). 
5.4.2 Rights of Home States under Human Rights Law  
With a continued focus on the scenarios in which extraterritorial jurisdiction conflicts 
with the law or policy of a host state, and thus primae facie disregards the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention: This section will discuss whether human rights law 
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contains a right of home states to protect the human rights of individuals in host states 
by means of nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction, even in scenarios in which 
the extraterritorially applied standards conflict with the law or policy of host states. 
The sources analysed will be (for the purpose of this thesis limited to): 
- ICCPR 
- ICESCR   
- Customary human rights law 
ICCPR and ICESCR: 
None of the two covenants contains a particular provision explicitly providing or 
confirming a right of states parties to protect human rights of individuals outside their 
territory or jurisdiction. The covenants’ conceptual approach is it to establish rights of 
individuals and peoples (‘human rights’) and set up corresponding obligations for 
states, in particular the (positive) obligation to prevent (and if appropriate punish) 
human rights abuses by private actors such as TNCs (see section 2.1). They do not 
formulate rights of states. However, if the mentioned positive obligations of (home) 
states would extend to human rights of individuals and people outside their territory 
(such as to individuals located in host states), this might imply their entitlement to take 
up extraterritorial measures such as extraterritorial jurisdiction. Hence, it needs to be 
analysed whether the positive obligations of (home) states contained in the two 
covenants extend extraterritorially: 
- ICCPR: Art. 2 (1) ICCPR states: “Each State Party […] undertakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant […]” 
(emphasis added). The ordinary meaning of the words suggests that the 
obligation of each state is clearly limited to the rights of individuals 
which are located ”within in its territory and are subject to its 
jurisdiction”. What exactly that means has been debated much. An 
extraterritorial extension of a state’s positive obligations has been 
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suggested for situations where a state exercises ‘effective control over 
foreign territory’ (for example in occupied territories), or when state 
agents or other state organs act abroad.114 However, the ‘thesis 
scenario’ is clearly different from these two cases: First, the 
individuals whose human rights are to be protected are located within 
the territory of the host state, which is not under any ‘effective control’ 
of any other state. Second, the home states have (usually) no 
jurisdiction over the individuals who are located in a host state, neither 
territorial nor nationality-based jurisdiction (the exceptional cases that 
nationals of the home state are located in the host state will not be 
discussed). The fact that a state party might have nationality-based 
jurisdiction over a potential perpetrator (such as TNCs) is not reflected 
in the ICCPR. Finally, the potential human rights abuses are also not 
committed by organs or agents of a home states, but by private actors 
over which the homes states has only very limited control.  
In conclusion, in the ‘thesis scenario the ICCPR cannot be interpreted 
as extending the (positive) obligations of home states to the individuals 
located in host states. 
 
- ICESCR: The ICESCR does not contain a jurisdictional provision. 
However, Art. 2 (1) ICESCR states: “Each State Party […] undertakes 
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, […] to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
[covenants] rights […]” (emphasis added). A literal interpretation of 
the ICESCR shows: Neither Art. 2 (1) nor any other provision of the 
ICESCR limits the “realization of the rights” (and the corresponding 
positive obligations of state parties) to individuals located within the 
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territory of a state party.115 However, Art. 2 (1) ICESCR gives likewise 
no indication that states parties were obliged to ‘undertake steps’ for 
realising the ICESCR rights of individuals located outside their own 
territory. Hence, the ICESCR remains ambiguous with respect to the 
territorial scope of states’ obligations.  
 
In case a treaty is ambiguous Art. 29 VCLT suggests a restrictive 
interpretation: “Unless a different intention appears from the treaty, or 
is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect 
of its entire territory.” Following this suggestion, the state obligations 
under the ICESCR would not extend to individuals outside the territory 
of a state party.  
However, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) - though it did not address the territorial scope of the 
ICESCR in general - seems to suggest a broader interpretation of the 
covenant (at least with respect to certain rights). Regarding the right to 
health (Art. 12 ICESCR) it stated: “States parties have to respect the 
enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent third 
parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to 
influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable 
international law”.116 A similar statement exists with respect to the 
right to water.117 
In conclusion, It is uncertain whether the positive ICESCR-obligations 
of home states have extraterritorial scope.118 However, supported by 
the aforementioned views of the CESCR an extraterritorial scope can 
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be constructed. But even when constructing an extraterritorial scope, 
any extraterritorial measures taken by a state party must be (as 
highlighted by the CESCR) “in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and applicable international law”.  
In Conclusion: The positive obligations of home states under the ICCPR do not extend 
extraterritorially. It can, therefore, not be argued that home states were allowed to 
exercise of nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to meet extraterritorial 
obligations under the ICCPR. With regard to the positive ICESCR-obligations of home 
states an extraterritorial scope can be constructed. However, as the CECSR highlighted, 
the extraterritorial measures taken in order to meet the extraterritorial obligations must 
comply with the “applicable international law”. Hence, the extraterritorial scope of 
homes states’ positive ICESCR-obligations cannot be used to redefine the limitations 
international law imposes on extraterritorial jurisdiction in scenarios in which the 
extraterritorially applied standards conflict with the law or policy of host states. 
 
Customary Human Rights Law (in particular jus cogens law): 
‘Ordinary customary law’: A ‘customary right’ of states to exercise nationality-based 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to protect the human rights in another state, would 
only exist if that would be subject to (‘opinio juris’ based) widespread and consistent 
state practice. However, presently there is no sufficient evidence for the existence of 
such state practice: States have in general remained rather reluctant to exercise 
nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction (common law states have for example been 
very reluctant to nationality-based extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction)119. And states 
have even been especially reluctant to apply legal standards extraterritorially if these 
would conflict with the law or policy of the other state concerned (a number of states 
which exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over nationals abroad even require 
proof that the committed act is also criminal under the ‘lex loci’)120. Some treaties 
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oblige the ‘states parties’ to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals 
with respect to certain crimes.121 However, there is no sufficient evidence, that this 
reflects (or has created) a rule of customary law allowing states to exercise nationality 
based extraterritorial jurisdiction even in cases where this would conflict with the law 
or policy of the other state. 
 
Jus cogens: Several arguments support the assumption that home states always (even in 
scenarios where extraterritorial jurisdiction conflicts with the law or policy of a host 
state) have the right to exercise nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction when they 
enforce jus cogens rules by that (for a list of jus cogens rules see section 2.2.1). This is 
in particular the case when a TNC (potentially) violates jus cogens rules (for example 
the prohibition on slavery), but the host state explicitly allows or tolerates it by its law 
or policy (be it by not prohibiting it or by not enforcing existing prohibitions). In this 
situation it can be argued that the jus cogens character of the violated norm ‘overrides’ 
the law and policy of the host state (with which the extraterritorial jurisdiction would 
conflict). The main implication of the concept of jus cogens is its peremptory 
character.122 As highlighted by the ICTY, the peremptory character of jus cogens norms 
has also the effect to “de-legitimise any [domestic] legislative, administrative or 
judicial act authorising [violations of jus cogens norms]”. Such domestic acts are not 
“accorded international legal recognition”.123 Applying this ‘de-legitimising’ effect to 
the ‘thesis scenario’ has the consequence that a host state’s domestic law or policy 
which directly or indirectly ‘authorises’ jus cogens violations by TNCs, is denied 
‘international recognition’. This implies that the host state cannot invoke such domestic 
law and policies on the international plane. 
An additional argument for the right to unlimitedly exercise nationality-based 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (enforcing jus cogens norms) derives from the jus cogens 
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implication that the jus cogens character of a norm entails universal jurisdiction. 
Universal jurisdiction implies that all states are allowed to exercise jurisdiction with 
respect to jus cogens violations, irrespective of the place where a jus cogens rule was 
violated and irrespective of the nationality of perpetrator or victim.124 Hence it can be 
argued, a fortiori, that states must be entitled to exercise nationality-based 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases where they would even be allowed to exercise 
universal jurisdiction (which does not even require a link such as nationality). However, 
this a fortiori argument is dependent on (and limited to) the exact scope of the universal 
jurisdiction the jus cogens character of a norm entails. Of particular relevance is the 
question: Does the jus cogens character of a norm entail universal jurisdiction only for 
punitive/repressive measures (in particular, in the field of criminal law and the law of 
tort) or also for preventive action. Since this ‘a fortiori argumentation’ is only of 
additional character (and since the capacity of this thesis is highly limited) a 
comprehensive analysis of the exact scope of universal jurisdiction cannot be provided. 
However, it is at least internationally acknowledged that universal jurisdiction is 
permitted in the field of criminal law.125 However, international law provides only little 
indication for the assumption that the right to universal jurisdiction might also include 
other punitive/repressive measures of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction, such as for 
example tort claims.126 Likewise, there is almost no indication in international 
jurisprudence, state practice or legal doctrine, suggesting that the right to universal 
jurisdiction would extend to preventive measures. Hence, presently the additional a 
fortiori argument supports only a right of every (home) state to unlimited extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the field of criminal law. 
Conclusion: There is no evidence for ‘ordinary customary law’ allowing for unlimited 
nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction in the field of human rights. However, an 
unlimited right to nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction can be constructed under 
the concept of jus cogens. Accordingly, home states are allowed to enforce jus cogens 
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rules by nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction even in scenarios where this 
would conflict with domestic law or policies of the host state. 
5.4.3 Human Rights Obligations of Host States and the Law on State 
Responsibility  
This section will analyse if the law on state responsibility gives home states the right to 
use nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction, in cases where a host state is not 
complying with its (positive) obligation to prevent private actor abuses on its territory. 
As discussed in sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2, positive obligations of host states derive from 
the ICCPR, ICESCR, and (as advocated by this thesis) from jus cogens. In absentia of 
any special non-compliance mechanisms the consequences of non-compliance with 
these positive obligations are determined by the secondary rules on state responsibility, 
of whom many are codified in the ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (in this section all references to articles are referring to 
these ILC Draft Articles).  
 
Beside the consequences of non-compliance listed in Art. 28 ff (duty of cessation, non-
repetition and reparation), the non-complying state has to tolerate countermeasures by 
‘injured states’ (Art. 49ff). Art. 42 defines ‘injured states’. In the ‘thesis scenario’ a 
home state is very unlikely to be an ‘injured state’ since the positive obligations of the 
host state are not - as required by Art. 42 (a) - owed individually to the home state, but 
to a group of states (for example to the state parties of the ICCPR and ICESCR) or even 
to the community of states as a whole. According to Art. 42 (b) home states could, 
furthermore, be ‘insured states’ if they were ‘specially affected’ by the non-compliance 
of the host state, or if the non-compliance of the host state was of ‘such a character as 
radically to change the position of all the other states to which the obligation is owed to 
with respect to the further performance of the obligation’. However, none of these two 
requirements seem to be fulfilled in the ‘thesis scenario’. Therefore, home states are 
likely to be ‘a state other than the injured state’. Which kind of ‘reaction’ the rules on 
state responsibility allow a ‘state other than the injured state’, is much debated. A ‘state 
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other than the injured state’ is allowed to invoke state responsibility (Art. 48), however, 
according to Art. 54 its reactions are limited to ‘lawful measures’, which would exclude 
extraterritorial jurisdiction conflicting with the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention. 
 
However, applying the afore-mentioned considerations to the ‘thesis scenario’, the 
following conclusion can be drawn: In case a host state does not meet its positive 
human rights obligations the law on state responsibilities gives home states the right to 
take ‘lawful measures’ only. I.e. Home states are only allowed to exercise nationality-
based extraterritorial jurisdiction which fully complies with international law. - 
However, even in the case that home states were (like an ‘injured state’) allowed to take 
‘countermeasures’, it seems difficult (though not impossible) to argue that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction could be a ‘countermeasure’ within the meaning of Art. 49ff. 
Though there is no legal definition of ‘countermeasures’, their purpose is mainly to 
induce a state to comply with its obligations, Art. 49 (1). However, nationality-based 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over TNCs (i.e. over private entities) puts only very 
indirectly - if at all - pressure on the host state itself. Hence, it can be doubted that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by its very nature can be characterized as a 
‘countermeasure’. But even if it was a ‘countermeasure’, it would be very difficult in 
practice to set up extraterritorial jurisdiction in a way meeting all the requirements the 
law on state responsibility provides for countermeasures (Art. 52f): Home states would 
be under obligation to: Notify host states of any decision to take countermeasures (i.e. 
exercise jurisdiction), to offer to negotiate with the host states, and to suspend the 
countermeasures (i.e. the jurisdiction)  immediately when the host state meets its 
obligation. These requirements would make extraterritorial jurisdiction over nationals - 
which usually requires stability and predictability, and is supposed to be applied in an 
equal manner towards all nationals -  almost infeasible.  
Conclusion:  In case the host states are not complying with their positive obligation to 
prevent private actor abuses of human rights, the law on state responsibility does limit 
home states to ‘lawful measures’ i.e. extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised as a tool of 
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‘invoking state responsibility’ must fully comply with the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention. 
5.4.4 The Concept of ‘Obligations Erga Omnes’ 
This section analyses whether and to what extent the concept of ‘obligations erga 
omnes’ implies the capacity to ‘override’ the sovereignty of host states.  The 
considerations of this section apply to situations in which home states (by 
extraterritorial jurisdictions) enforce human rights which are subject to erga omnes 
obligations of the host state. 
 
The ICJ described ‘obligations erga omnes’ as: “obligations of a state towards the 
international community as a whole […] By their very nature [they] are the concern of 
all states. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all states can be held to have 
a legal interest in their protection”.127 The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
refer likewise to the concept of erga omnes in Art. 48 (1) (b).  Which particular ‘human 
rights obligations’ have erga omnes character, is controversially debated: The ICJ 
considered the following norms as having erga omnes character: The ‘outlawing of 
genocide’, ‘the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person 
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination’ and ‘the obligation to 
respect the right to self-determination’.128 Some commentators hold the opinion that 
only jus cogens obligations are erga omnes obligations, whereas other consider the 
concept of erga omnes rights as a wider concept than the jus cogens concept.129 A 
detailed debate on the exact scope of obligations erga omnes cannot be provided due to 
the limited capacity of this thesis. However, there is an indication for the emerging 
consensus that (at least) all jus cogens obligations have erga omnes character.130 
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But what legal consequences are attached to the erga omnes character of an obligation?  
So far there is neither case law nor any state practice in which the erga omnes character 
of certain human rights obligations was invoked in order to ‘override’ the sovereignty 
of the state bearing the obligation. In practice states have invoked the erga omnes 
character of human rights obligations mainly in order to claim their right to call 
attention to cases where another state is not complying with its human rights 
obligations, and to call upon that state to cease the non-compliance.131 Moreover, in the 
ICJ East Timor case Portugal invoked the erga omnes character of Australia’s 
obligation to respect the ‘right to self determination of the people of East Timor’ in 
order to try Australia before the ICJ. But the ICJ rejected this attempt since it decided - 
even though it confirmed the erga omnes character of Australia’s obligation - to have no 
jurisdiction because it would have to evaluate the lawfulness of the conduct of a third 
state (Indonesia) which had not consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.132  
 
State practice, case law and legal doctrine on the legal effect of ‘erga omnes’ suggest 
that this legal effect is limited to the right of standing (‘jus standi’) in inter-state claims. 
“Erga omnes rules operate to expand the scope of possible claimants in those situations 
where traditional rules of standing do not suffice to ensure that all rules of international 
law are capable of supporting effective inter-state claims“.133  
 
In conclusion: At present the legal effect of the ‘erga omnes character’ of norms is 
limited to a purely procedural effect in inter-state claims. The ‘erga omnes character’ 
has therefore no capacity to ‘override’ the sovereignty of host states. However, the erga 
omnes concept might be refined in the future. There is no reason why the ‘legal interest’ 
states have in the ‘protection of the rights involved in obligations erga omnes’ should 
remain limited to the jus standi in inter-state claims. 
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5.4.5 Conclusion 
This section was analysing scenarios in which extraterritorial jurisdiction primae facie 
are contra international law (because they conflict with the host state’s law or policy) 
from a human rights perspective. It was assumed that home states (by extraterritorial 
jurisdiction) only enforce such ‘corporate human rights standards’ which a host state is 
obliged to ensure on its territory.  
 
The thesis suggests for such cases that the host state is deprived of its right to invoke 
(on the international plane) such domestic law and policy that are not in conformity 
with its international human rights obligations (and therefore conflict with the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of home states). That implies that even ‘extraterritorial 
jurisdiction which conflicts with a host state’s law or policy’ is in conformity with 
international law, if a conflict (between the extraterritorial jurisdiction and the law or 
policy of the host state) had not existed if the host state would have met its obligations 
under international human rights law. In addition, this thesis suggests that 
‘extraterritorial jurisdiction conflicting with a host state’s law or policy’ is also 
permitted under international law if the host state aims at preventing (or punishing) jus 
cogens violations of TNCs. The crucial argument for the ‘reasonableness’ of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in these scenarios is the importance of an effictive protection 
of jus cogens and other international human rights standards to ”the international 
political, legal or economic system” (for the requirement of ’reasonableness’ see section 
5.2.3). 
 
The other human rights related aspects discussed in this chapter (extraterritorial scope 
of ICCPR and ICESCR, rights under customary human rights law, the law on state 
responsibility in cases of a host state’s non-compliance with its human rights 
obligations and the concept of erga omnes) do not imply the capacity to redefine the 
limitations the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention impose on extraterritorial 




Limited to an analysis of the ICCPR, ICESCR and universal customary law, this thesis 
has demonstrated that international law already provides for comprehensive ‘corporate 
human rights standards’. However, these standards are mainly of indirect nature, i.e. 
they are established by obliging the states to control TNCs, and to prevent and punish 
human rights abuses committed by them (‘positive obligations’).  As this thesis has 
outlined, not all host states have the capacity, willingness or interest which is necessary 
to sufficiently control the business activities of TNCs on their territory. Therefore, the 
thesis has analysed the possibility that home states of TNCs contribute to the 
enforcement of the ‘corporate human rights standards’ in host states by exercising 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In doing so, the analysis was limited to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction based on the ‘active nationality principle’, i.e. on the right of each state to 
exercise jurisdiction over its nationals. 
In the thesis the view has been taken that the attempt of a home state to exercise 
nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction directly over foreign subsidiaries of TNCs 
(i.e. over corporations which are neither incorporated under the law of the homes state 
laws nor have a registered office or conduct any business on its territory) is highly 
likely to be contra international law. The thesis has rather drawn the conclusion that a 
home state is most likely only allowed to assert ‘corporate nationality’ of a corporation 
if the company is registered under the law of that state and has a registered office there.  
 
The further analysis of the ‘thesis scenario’ has revealed that - given a home state 
asserts ‘corporate nationality’ in accordance with international law - nationality-based 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited only by the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention (as ‘prohibitive rules’ of international law) and the ‘rule of reason’.  It 
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could be demonstrated that the extraterritorial application of ‘corporate human rights 
standards’ to nationals (= TNCs) abroad (= in a host state) is in conformity with 
international law if the extraterritorially applied standards harmonise with the law and 
policies the host state has with respect to corporate standards on its territory. This 
category includes also cases in which a host state does not control TNCs sufficiently 
due to ‘lacking capacity’ or ‘lacking interest’. Furthermore, it was demonstrated in the 
thesis that all other scenarios (i.e. scenarios in which the extraterritorially applied 
standards conflict with the law and policy of a host state) are, primae facie, not in 
accordance with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. However, the thesis 
could reveal the wrongness of this primae-facie-result by reassessing the ‘thesis 
scenario’ in special consideration of its ‘human rights context’ (i.e. the fact that the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction enforces ‘human rights standards’ the host state is obliged to 
ensure on its territory).  In doing so, the thesis suggested and substantiated that host 
states are not allowed to defeat nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction by 
invoking a conflict with their domestic law or policy, if this conflict only exists because 
the law and policy are not in conformity with the host state’s international human rights 
obligations.  
 
The thesis could demonstrate that nationality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
TNCs exercised by home states is to a great extent permitted by international law. This 
allows the conclusion that the reluctance of states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over TNCs is not so much a question of its permissibility. To a much greater degree it 
seems to be a political issue. Extraterritorial jurisdiction over TNCs’ activities abroad 
might be sometimes considered to be ‘modern day imperialism’. However, to an even 
greater extent states might be concerned that exercising  extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
TNCs incorporated under their laws (and often having their headquarters or a major 
branch in the state) might motivate these TNCs to relocate to other states, which refrain 
from extraterritorial jurisdiction. Such a relocation would imply a loss of jobs, 
investment and tax income. This reasonable concern points at the need for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to be exercised collectively (for example within the EU), or 
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internationally coordinated approach, i.e. that as many (potential) home states as 
possible exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over TNCs, so that the number of ‘safe 
havens’ is minimised.  
 
At the end this thesis wants to express the view that extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
TNCs is certainly not the ‘panacea’ as sometimes assumed. In the long run a sufficient 
and sustainable protection of ‘human rights standards’ in host states requires 
international cooperation that focuses on convincing host states of the necessity to 
enforce ‘corporate human rights standards’ on their territory, and  on strengthening the 
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